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ABSTRACT 
The government of Indonesia has started the implementation of locally based health-
financing schemes based on health insurance principles. This scheme is commonly known as 
JPK-GAKIN, which is a health-financing scheme through which the poor can access health 
care in public facilities, including primary and secondary health care. Due to the perceived 
success of JPK-GAKIN pilots, the government has decided to provide JPK-GAKIN in all 
districts in Indonesia from January 1, 2005.  
 
This study looks at the effects of different characteristics of JPK-GAKIN program on 
healthcare service provision, utilization of health care services, quality of healthcare 
provision, and how insurance characteristics can influence the relationships between 
stakeholders. Three districts were selected for the case studies: Purbalingga (Central Java), 
Tabanan (Bali) and East Sumba (Nusa Tenggara Timur).  
 
We found that compared with previous health financing schemes, JPK-GAKIN scheme has 
achieved better results in providing access to adequate health care coverage to members of 
the population, especially the poor. However, we found several problems associated with the 
scheme, such as: there is a need to improve its targeting and efficiency, it needs stricter 
financial monitoring and auditing, and it needs to increase stakeholders’ involvement in the 
governance of the scheme. We will elaborate on these concerns and recommend possible 
policy options to resolve them in this paper.  
 
Keywords: local health financing; JPK-GAKIN; public health; poverty; Indonesia.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The Government of Indonesia (GoI) has designated a number of districts as pilot 
areas to implement locally based health-financing schemes based on health 
insurance principles (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan (JPK)). This scheme is 
commonly known as JPK-Gakin (JPK untuk Keluarga Miskin). JPK-Gakin is a 
health-financing scheme through which the poor can access public health care 
through primary and secondary health care facilities. The pilot JPK-Gakin project 
started in 15 districts and two provinces in Indonesia, and was later expanded to 
additional regions in the following year. 
 
Originally, JPK-Gakin was managed by Bapel (Badan Pengelola: Management 
Unit), an independent body separate from the Regional Health Agency (DinKes: 
Dinas Kesehatan) that often consists partially of officials who were working for the 
DinKes prior to the establishment of the Bapel. Due to the perceived success of 
JPK-Gakin, however, the GoI has decided to provide JPK-Gakin in all districts in 
Indonesia from 1 January 2005. This time, JPK-Gakin has to be provided by PT 
Askes, which will run it as a government monopoly, in compliance with the 
newly passed Law No. 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security System. This 
has been done despite the concerns of some regional officials that PT Askes has 
not been successful in delivering good quality health benefits for its primary 
clientele, the Indonesian civil service. 
 
This study aims to investigate the effects of different characteristics of the JPK-Gakin 
program on healthcare service provision, utilization of health care services, quality of 
healthcare provision, and how insurance characteristics can influence the 
relationships between stakeholders. Three districts were selected for the case studies: 
Purbalingga (Central Java), Tabanan (Bali) and East Sumba (Nusa Tenggara Timur). 
We selected each of these districts for a specific reason. Purbalingga was the very first 
district to initiate health insurance coverage for the poor in 2001. Purbalingga’s 
scheme aims to extend the coverage of insured people in the region not just to the 
poor, but eventually to its entire population, although non-poor participants will pay 
a premium depending on their income. Tabanan provides a scheme through PT 
Askes and is also a “second-generation JPK-Gakin” pilot area, thus this its program 
can also highlight initial experiences with the provision of health insurance for the 
poor. East Sumba is one district that has a very high poverty rate and thus the 
provision of health insurance can have a major influence on increasing access to 
health care for the poor. It is also a district that experiences many problems with 
distance as the population is spread over a wide area. 
 
Compared with previous health financing schemes promoted in Indonesia such as the 
JPS-BK scheme, the JPK-Gakin scheme has achieved better results in providing access 
to adequate health care coverage to members of the population, especially the poor. 
One of the reasons why it has achieved better results than previous schemes is the fact 
that JPK-Gakin is fully administered by local governments (the funding is shared 
between central and local government budgets). Because it is locally administered, it is 
easier for the government to develop innovations within the scheme, dealing with 
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problems and members’ complaints, and taking into account local conditions that 
might affect health care delivery in a particular region. 
 
The JPK-Gakin scheme needs to be improved in several ways, however, in order to 
enhance its effectiveness, improve its efficiency, and increase the quality of services 
received by its beneficiaries/clients. There are several problems that need to be 
immediately addressed by the DinKes, Bapel and health providers so they do not 
hinder the effectiveness of JPK-Gakin in delivering its service to its members/clients. 
These include the following: 
 
• There seems to be a lack of efficiency in the management of JPK-Gakin funds by 
health providers (especially at RSUD). Claims were approved with little 
verification and inspection to ensure that they were accurate and there are 
indications that most of the funds were used to subsidize the care of non-poor 
patients rather than the poor ones who were supposed to benefit. 
 
• There appear to be a number of formal and informal barriers whose effect is to 
discourage some Gakin members from using the services to which they are 
entitled. These barriers include high transportation costs, the delay in the 
distribution of their membership card, etc. Such barriers might discourage the 
poor from using JPK-Gakin services and could make many JPK-Gakin members 
reluctant to seek treatment in public facilities. 
 
• The low utilization rate of JPK-Gakin members using the services they are 
entitled to results in the misallocation of Gakin subsidies to the supposedly better-
off members, who can actually afford to pay some of their own health care costs. 
It is likely that most of these funds were used instead to upgrade the buildings and 
medical equipment of the hospital and to subsidize other hospital patients, 
especially those from the upper income brackets. For instance, in Purbalingga it is 
estimated that 79% of the JPK-Gakin funds subsidize the health care services of 
non-poor patients at puskesmas and at the local public hospital (RSUD) with 
87.63% of overall JPK-Gakin funds going to non-poor patients. 
 
• It was also found that the unit cost per patient for each JPK-Gakin member treated 
at hospital in these districts is quite high, ranging from Rp480,505 in East Sumba to 
Rp7,122,559 in Purbalingga. It is inconceivable that the patient’s costs reflected in 
this calculation were all expended on the treatment of JPK-Gakin members and it 
is quite possible that a significant proportion of funds were “leaked” and resulted in 
the treatment of non-poor patients in these hospitals. In order for the JPK-Gakin 
scheme to become truly pro-poor, this misallocation needs to be addressed. 
 
• There is little involvement by non-government stakeholders, in particular, JPK-
Gakin members/clients, in the design, implementation and monitoring of the 
scheme. JPK-Gakin members are just passive clients. Because they do not participate 
in the scheme’s decision-making processes, the management of the program is less 
transparent and accountable to its stakeholders, especially its members. 
 
• With the exception of East Sumba, there is no involvement by private health 
providers in the provision of health services for JPK-Gakin members. They are 
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only able to seek health services in publicly managed health facilities (puskesmas 
and RSUD). The fact that most private providers do not participate in the 
scheme results in a more limited choice of health providers available for its 
members, and, therefore, in restricted access to better quality services. 
 
• The choice of insurance manager/carrier is also becoming more limited, with the 
creation of the PT Askes monopoly to manage the JPK-Gakin scheme. The 
decision was made by the Ministry of Health (MoH) without advanced 
consultation with local governments, Bapels and other stakeholders, creating 
tension between the MoH, PT Askes and these stakeholders that could 
potentially create disincentives between them to cooperate and coordinate JPK-
Gakin operations. 
 
• JPK-Gakin funding largely depends on subsidies from the fuel subsidy 
compensation (PKPS-BBM/Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar 
Minyak) scheme and from the general block grant (Dana Alokasi Umum – DAU) 
given by the central government to district/local governments that largely funds 
the local government budget (APBD). Funding from other sources (e.g. member’s 
premiums) only forms a small part of the program’s overall funds. In the long run, 
this might make the scheme unsustainable as PKPS-BBM and DAU grants are 
reduced, creating potential disruptions in the delivery of services. 
 
• Other than the required quarterly financial reports, there is little monitoring 
done by the Bapel and DinKes on the use of JPK-Gakin funds by providers. Thus, 
it is not known whether all the reimbursement claims made by the providers are 
made for services actually provided. This could provide the opportunity to misuse 
the funds through the submission of fraudulent claims. 
 
• Coordination between related government agencies (DinKes, Bapel and health 
providers) could be improved further. While in these three districts there are 
efforts to coordinate the operation of the JPK-Gakin scheme, the outcome has 
not yet been optimized and turf-battles and finger-pointing between these 
agencies are still common when problems arise. 
 
To address these problems and to make the JPK-Gakin scheme work better, the 
following steps are recommended for implementation by the government, Bapel, 
health providers and other stakeholders. We target these recommendations at the 
local governments that manage and implement the JPK-Gakin scheme, along with 
the central government (Ministry of Health) that will supervise and provide policy 
advice to the local implementers. We have divided these recommendations into 
short, medium and long-term recommendations, based on our assessment of how long 
it would take to implement them. Most of these recommendations should be 
implemented by local governments, after consultation with the central government, 
the private sector, NGOs, and most importantly, their citizens, who are the 
beneficiaries of the JPK-Gakin scheme. 
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Short-term recommendations (implemented within the next one to two years): 
 
• Increase coordination between different government agencies, especially between 
DinKes and PT Askes in managing JPK-Gakin delivery at the local level. 
 
• Create clear guidelines on the functions, duties and responsibilities of each 
government agency in administering the JPK-Gakin scheme at the local level. 
With such guidelines, the functions of each agency would be clarified and turf-
battles between them could be avoided. 
 
• Eliminate formal and informal barriers for Gakin families to use the services to 
which they are entitled. The government also needs to eliminate the 
misallocation of Gakin subsidies to higher income groups, to ensure that the JPK-
Gakin scheme truly meets its intended purpose of providing health financing for 
poor families. 
 
• Improve the efficiency of health services delivery by health providers (puskesmas 
and RSUD). Health services given to JPK-Gakin members should be appropriate 
to their needs and should be medically necessary. Stricter monitoring procedures 
should be introduced to ensure that Gakin funds are used as efficiently as possible 
and that all expended funds are actually accounted for. 
 
• Improve the quality of services provided by puskesmas. Many citizens perceive 
puskesmas as providing poor quality services, and thus, they are not willing to seek 
primary health care treatment there. Incentives to improve the quality of health 
service delivery at puskesmas should be introduced. At the same time, however, 
puskesmas should not use such incentives to increase their salaries or to pay out 
cash bonuses to puskesmas staff. 
 
• Improve socialization/marketing techniques to recruit new JPK-Gakin members, 
using low-cost mass-marketing tools that would have wide credibility among 
prospective clients. Kaders (health cadres) might be a potential tool for such 
socialization purposes. Incentives could be created to make kaders more 
productive in recruiting new members. This could include regular honorariums 
for kaders that are higher than the current financial incentives available to them. 
 
Medium-term recommendations (implemented within one to two years): 
• Reactivate puskesmas’ activities at village level (especially in remote districts), for 
instance, through reintroducing mobile health clinics (puskesmas keliling) or by 
training village level health providers (such as alternative healers or dukun) so 
that they can provide first-aid medical assistance to villagers, help doctors and 
other health practitioners at puskesmas who are travelling on puskesmas keliling, 
and to give referrals to puskesmas in cases where they are unable to treat the 
patients due to the seriousness of the patient’s medical condition. By undertaking 
these tasks, it is hoped that access to health facilities at the village level can be 
improved and that citizens do not have to seek treatment at puskesmas unless 
their conditions cannot be treated at the village level. 
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• Provide stricter monitoring (both internal and external) to ensure that the JPK-
Gakin funds allocated to provide health services at RSUD and puskesmas are 
spent effectively and efficiently. The monitoring should be done both by Bapel 
(or Bawasda/The District Auditing Board) and also by an independent 
monitoring unit that could be set up by an NGO/CSO, by the community or by a 
JPK-Gakin members’ association. 
 
 
• Implement measures to increase JPK-Gakin members’ participation in the planning, 
implementation and monitoring of the scheme. The members should be allowed a 
voice in the decision-making process affecting their welfare and their membership in 
the JPK-Gakin scheme. The creation of a JPK-Gakin members’ association at 
grassroots level might be the first step to achieving this goal. 
 
• Consider including private providers (e.g. private doctors, private hospitals and 
health clinics) in the list of providers of the JPK-Gakin scheme. This would 
increase the choice of providers for members of the scheme and would improve 
their access to needed health services. In order to attract private providers into 
the scheme, higher reimbursement payments set close to the market rate might be 
necessary so that the payment is in line with the rate charged by private 
providers. This might however, require premium increases that might force some 
JPK-Gakin members to drop out of the scheme because they could no longer 
afford the premium. 
 
• Consider ending the PT Askes monopoly as the insurance carrier for the JPK-
Gakin scheme and open the selection of insurance carrier to a competitive 
bidding process done by each local government. These companies would run the 
financial management, claims and reimbursement of the Gakin funds in each 
region, while local governments (DinKes) would continue to issue appropriate 
regulations and monitor how the program is operated. All insurance companies 
(both state and privately owned) should be allowed to participate in this bidding 
process and given a chance to manage the JPK-Gakin scheme based on their 
previous achievements and their ability to serve its clients efficiently. 
 
Long-term recommendations (implemented in three or more years): 
• Efforts need to be taken to reduce or eliminate the dependency of the JPK-Gakin 
scheme on the PKPS-BBM and APBD-DAU grants to make it self-financing 
through premiums or other contributions from members/clients, either through 
increasing premiums for better-off non-Gakin members or by introducing new 
taxes to fund the scheme (e.g. introducing local cigarette and liquor taxes). Of 
course, efforts need to be taken to ensure that this measure does not reduce 
members’ access to essential health services they need and would not be 
disruptive of local economic activity nor affect the local labor market. 
 
• Consider charging a minimum premium rate (or co-insurance) for JPK-Gakin 
members, since it seems that paying Gakin members are more likely to demand 
better services from the providers than non-paying ones and are more likely to 
complain when these services are not delivered to their satisfaction. Of course, 
the charges imposed on Gakin members should be set at an appropriate minimal 
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level so that they do not drop out of the JPK-Gakin scheme altogether due to 
affordability issues. This has been done in the Rembang District where Gakin 
members are required to pay a premium of Rp5,000/person/year to receive their 
program benefits. It was quite successful; since the poor pay a small portion of 
their premium, they are more inclined to monitor the service quality of their 
health services and to complain if they think they receive unsatisfactory 
treatment. 
 
• Carefully study the possibility of introducing a health voucher scheme, in which 
poor citizens would directly control the health subsidies given to them. This is 
done to minimize possible leakages of the subsidy to higher income patients and 
to promote accountability and improved service quality, since voucher holders 
could choose any health providers they feel would provide the best services 
available to them (both public and private providers would be allowed to treat 
voucher holders), so there would be competition between providers to attract the 
most voucher holders to their facilities. Of course, leakages could also occur in a 
voucher scheme if poor voucher holders sold their vouchers to those on higher 
incomes. Therefore steps should be taken to minimize this possibility (such as 
recording the names of voucher holders and assigning them a unique 
identification number). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Government of Indonesia (GoI) has promoted programs on health care 
financing for the poor based on the notion that good health is one of the basic rights 
of all citizens. There is limited access to health care by the poor who, for a number of 
reasons, have much lower rates of utilization of health care services than the rich. 
The GoI has introduced a number of policies to increase access to, and utilization of, 
health care services. In 1998, the GoI introduced the Social Safety Net for the 
Health Sector Program (JPS-BK1) to increase access to health care services for the 
poor through community healthcare centers (puskesmas) and village midwives (bidan 
desa). Under this program, poor citizens received a card with which they were eligible 
for free health care services from public primary health service providers. In 2001, the 
GoI introduced additional subsidies aimed at health care services for the poor 
through the energy subsidies program (Penanggulangan Dampak Pengurangan Subsidi 
Energi – Bidang Kesehatan). In 2002, this program was renamed the oil subsidies 
program (Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak) but the 
nature of the program stayed the same. 
 
The health card program was implemented to increase access to health care services 
for the poor but it experienced many problems with identification of the poor, the 
distribution of the health card, additional administration burdens on health care 
providers, and, in particular, the financial governance of the government. Thus, 
access to health care services, especially for the poor, is still very limited. Due to the 
limitations of the health card program the GoI looked for a more effective, efficient 
and sustainable financing mechanism. 
 
After the 2001 program of administrative decentralization, the central government 
designated a number of districts as pilot areas to implement locally based health-
financing schemes based on health insurance principles (Jaminan Pemeliharaan 
Kesehatan (JPK)). This scheme is commonly known as JPK-Gakin (JPK untuk 
Keluarga Miskin). JPK-Gakin is a health-financing scheme through which the poor 
can access health care in public facilities, including primary and secondary health 
care. Through the use of insurance principles, the problem of administration overload 
of the puskesmas would be solved and cost-containment made possible. The pilot 
JPK-Gakin project started in 15 districts and two provinces in Indonesia, and was 
expanded to additional regions the following year.2 
 
These locally based schemes do contain many significant differences. For example, 
the provision of JPK-Gakin was, until the end of 2004, not limited to one specific 
health insurance provider and as a result health insurers with different backgrounds 
provide health insurance in different districts. Three of the main differences include 
the benefit package, the insurer and the reimbursement system. 
                                                 
1 Jaringan Pengaman Sosial Bidang Kesehatan. 
2 Currently, Indonesia consists of over 400 districts. Thus, initially this was a small number of pilot 
projects. In 2004 the program expanded to a total of 25 districts and four provinces providing the 
health insurance scheme. 
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In most districts, JPK-Gakin is managed by Bapel (Badan Pengelola: Management 
Unit), an independent body separate from the Regional Health Agency (DinKes: 
Dinas Kesehatan) that often consists partially of officials who were working for the 
DinKes prior to the establishment of the Bapel. In some other cases JPK-Gakin is 
provided by PT Askes, which is a state-owned health insurance enterprise established 
by the Ministry of Health in 1968, which has an independent board of directors but is 
under the supervision of the Health Ministry. PT Askes is a for-profit state-owned 
company that provides a number of different benefit packages in Indonesia. Benefit 
packages (including those for the poor) provided by PT Askes are nationally set, so 
districts do not have the authority to make changes to accommodate local needs. 
 
Due to the success of JPK-Gakin, the GoI decided in November 2004 to provide JPK-
Gakin in all districts in Indonesia, however, a number of adaptations were made with 
the pilot projects. The main change is that from 1 January 2005, through a decree of 
the Minister of Health (Decree No. 1241/MENKES/SK/XI/2004), JPK-Gakin has to 
be provided by PT Askes, which will run it as a government monopoly, in 
compliance with the newly passed Law No. 40/2004 of the National Social Security 
System. This policy change was made without consultation with local governments 
implementing the JPK-Gakin scheme and other related stakeholders, who were only 
informed about it after the decision was finalized. Of course, local governments were 
not happy about this new policy, as they felt that PT Askes had not been successful 
in delivering good quality health benefits to its primary clientele, the Indonesian 
civil service, and they claimed that the JPK-Gakin scheme managed by local 
governments provided better benefit packages than PT Askes. Since the decision has 
become final, however, they could not do anything to reverse it. Currently, several 
districts in East Nusa Tenggara, East Indonesia, have started to implement the law 
and other regions in Indonesia will soon follow suit. 
 
In this study we aim to look at the effects of these different characteristics of the 
program on healthcare service provision, utilization of health care services, quality 
of healthcare provision, and how insurance characteristics can influence the 
relationships between stakeholders. Some districts have managed to implement and 
continue the scheme relatively well. Why have some districts been more successful 
in implementing the JPK-Gakin program than other districts? What are the barriers 
to better service delivery for the poor? What factors influence significant 
improvements in these services? What are some possible policy alternatives to make 
the JPK-Gakin scheme work better for its members? 
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II. DISTRICTS’ INFORMATION 
 
 
Three districts were selected for the case studies; Purbalingga (Central Java), 
Tabanan (Bali) and East Sumba (Nusa Tenggara Timur). Each of these districts was 
selected for a specific reason. Purbalingga was the very first district to initiate health 
insurance coverage for the poor in 2001. The Purbalingga government has aimed to 
extend the coverage of insured people in the region not just to the poor, but 
eventually to its entire population, although non-poor participants will pay a 
premium depending on their income. Tabanan provides its scheme through PT 
Askes. Tabanan is also a “second-generation JPK-Gakin” pilot area that was 
introduced in 2004. Its program can also highlight initial experiences with the 
provision of health insurance for the poor. The third case study, East Sumba, is one 
district that has a very high poverty rate and thus the provision of health insurance 
can have a major influence increasing access to health care for the poor. East Sumba 
is also a district that experiences many problems with distance as the population is 
spread over a wide area. 
 
The table below shows differences between the benefit package and provision of the 
health insurance schemes. 
 
Table 1. Comparison between Insurance Schemes Adopted  
by the Three Districts Surveyed 
  Purbalingga East Sumba Tabanan 
Insurer Bapel Bapel PT Askes 
Reimbursement Capitation Capitation and FFS Capitation and FFS 
Benefit package Complete, everything 
covered 
Flexible  
Start 2002 2003 April 2004 
Insurance term Once a year; August - July Once a year Once a year; April - 
March 
Poverty rate 28% 66.5% 9% 
Source: data received from DinKes and Bapel of each district. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Information for this study was obtained from in-depth semi-structured interviews 
conducted with related informants in the three districts mentioned above. 
Informants included officials of the district Health Agency (Dinas Kesehatan-DinKes), 
the district scheme managers (Badan Penyelenggara-Bapel), puskesmas staff (puskesmas 
head, doctors and other support staff), district hospital (Rumah Sakit Umum Daerah-
RSUD) staff (head, doctors and other support staff), village officials, village midwives 
(bidan desa), village volunteers (kaders), and patients/clients who enrolled in the JPK-
Gakin scheme in these districts. The interviews were conducted in fieldwork 
conducted throughout the months of December 2004 and January 2005. 
 
In addition to these interviews, we also collected relevant documents regarding the 
JPK-Gakin schemes operating in these districts, such as: any relevant district-level 
laws and regulations, financial reports, patient visitation reports at the RSUD and 
puskesmas, and so forth. We were able to obtain all of these documents in Purbalingga 
and East Sumba districts. In Tabanan district, however, we were only able to obtain 
some of the regulations and patient visitation reports and no financial reports. 
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IV. FINDINGS 
 
 
A.  OVERVIEW 
 
Based on our study in the three JPK-Gakin pilot districts (Purbalingga, Tabanan and 
East Sumba), we found that, in comparison with previous health financing schemes 
such as the JPS-BK scheme, the JPK-Gakin scheme has achieved better results in 
providing access to adequate health care coverage to district residents, especially the 
poor. 
 
One of the reasons for this is the fact that JPK-Gakin is fully administered by local 
governments (the funding is shared between the central and local government 
budgets). Because it is locally administered, it is easier for the government to develop 
innovations within the scheme, deal with problems and members’ complaints as well 
as take into account local conditions that might affect health care delivery in a 
particular region. Each of the three districts we visited has a different financing 
mechanism and administration: 
 
• Purbalingga chose to have an insurance scheme in which members are divided 
into three groups: Strata I for the poor, Strata II for the formerly or near poor, and 
Strata III are for the well-off citizens of the district. The premium for Strata I is 
fully paid by the government, while the premium for Strata II and III are paid by 
the members, either partially (Strata II) or fully (Strata III).  It is expected that 
within the next decade the Purbalingga scheme could be self-financing, with 
Strata II and III premiums subsidizing Strata I. However, at this time it is the 
other way around, with Gakin (Strata I) members subsidizing the other two 
groups that are better-off (Stratas II and III), see section d for further details.  
 
• Tabanan, a second-generation JPK-Gakin district, decided to contract out the 
management of its JPK-Gakin scheme to PT Askes, a state-owned company 
specializing in providing health insurance for Indonesian civil servants. Tabanan 
assigned responsibility to PT Askes as the insurer of JPK-Gakin because it wants 
to avoid the risk of failure that can cause serious financial problems and because 
PT Askes is seen as a professional institution that has the required length of 
experience in managing insurance schemes as well as a wide coverage area. The 
benefit package offered for the JPK-Gakin participants is similar to the one 
provided to civil servants. 
 
• East Sumba in the East Nusa Tenggara province, was able to provide a JPK-Gakin 
scheme even though it is one of the poorest districts in Indonesia with about 
three quarters of its population living below the poverty line. From 1 January 
2005, the insurance management was split between PT Askes, who will manage 
the health care financing for the urban population, and the East Sumba Health 
Agency (Dinas Kesehatan-DinKes), which continues to manage health care 
financing for the rural population. 
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Since JPK-Gakin schemes are fully managed by the districts themselves, they can be 
flexible in administering the program and dealing with local situations that might 
inhibit health care delivery in their respective regions. For instance, East Sumba has 
provided a transportation allowance for JPK-Gakin members living in remote areas, 
since they often have to travel a great distance to seek health treatment. The 
allowance helps them to offset the transportation cost to and from health facilities so 
that the cost of transportation does not discourage them from seeking health care. 
 
There are also indications that Gakin members are more likely to express their 
complaints or dissatisfaction about how the program is being administered to the 
local government’s DinKes or Bapel offices than was the case when the health scheme 
was still managed by the central government. Since local governments are perceived 
to be “closer” to their citizens, people have more confidence that they will get a 
response to their complaints from local governments, compared with lodging a 
complaint with a central authority in Jakarta. Thus, Gakin members are more likely 
to file a complaint with the local government, increasing their voice in how the JPK-
Gakin scheme is administered. As described later in this section, however, this does 
not mean that local citizens were more involved in the design and implementation of 
JPK-Gakin compared with previous schemes, since it was also found that they 
continue to be excluded from the policy deliberation process. 
 
B.  THE INSURED 
 
After a process of identification, all the poor are automatically enrolled into the JPK-
Gakin program. The districts have different poverty levels, the poverty rate at the 
national level is around 16%. East Sumba has high levels of poverty, whereas 
Tabanan has only a very small proportion of poor people. 
 
In Purbalingga 57,362 people have been identified as eligible for free health 
insurance, this equates to about 28% of the total population. In addition, there are 
42,533 Strata II and 23,408 Strata III members, who pay premiums to access the 
health services, either in part (Strata II) or in full (Strata III). As a result, almost 
60% of the population in Purbalingga in total is insured via the benefit package of 
the Bapel. Of this number, however, only about 28% were classified as poor. 
 
In East Sumba as many as 129,074 people were classified as being poor. This varies 
widely from the number identified by the central government (81,200). After the 
first round of identification and verification, the second identification round in 
2004 identified a total of 159,037 people who had income levels below the poverty 
line. This does not mean that people’s income over that period decreased 
dramatically, but is the result of a different and (according to the Bapel and other 
stakeholders) improved identification process. As the central government only 
officially funds the 81,200 people it recognizes as poor, PT Askes will provide 
health insurance for that number of people, whereas Bapel will manage the JPK-
Gakin program for those other poor recognized by the second identification round. 
Based upon 2003 data from Statistics Indonesia, the total population in the region 
was 198,940 people, thus around 66.5% of the population in Kabupaten Sumba 
Timur is identified as being poor. 
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Kabupaten Tabanan in Bali is a relatively wealthy district with a lower poverty rate 
than the national average. In 2004, only 10,710 gakin households or 37,791 persons 
were identified. This is about 9% of the district population. 
 
The benefit packages differ between districts and the size of the package has a large 
influence on the usability of the package for the poor. The packages provided to the poor 
participants (Gakin) in Purbalingga and East Sumba are very complete without 
limitations, ceilings or co-payments but exclude some very expensive, but infrequent 
treatments. The PT Askes provided packages in Tabanan are, however, more limited due 
to the introduction of ceilings and co-payments. The premium in Purbalingga is 
relatively low; set at Rp50,000/family per year, thus equaling approximately 
Rp12,500/person per year, whereas the premiums in East Sumba and Tabanan are set at 
Rp60,000/person/year. 
 
Table 2 shows the number of poor citizens (Gakin) who are members of the insurance 
scheme, along with the percentage of the district population that is considered to be 
poor. 
 
Table 2: Number of JPK-Gakin Members in the Three Districts Surveyed 
Name of District Gakin members (persons) Total Population Percentage of the 
population 
East Sumba 129,074 193,940 66.55%
Purbalingga 229,448 822,020 27.91%
Tabanan 37,791 419,900 9.00%
Source: authors’ calculation based on district data received. 
 
C.  FINANCING AND REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM 
 
It should be noted that the JPK-Gakin scheme, while claiming to be a health 
insurance scheme, is not a scheme based on real insurance principles.3 Instead, it is a 
financial transfer scheme that is supposed to channel funds from wealthier citizens to 
the poorer ones through the intermediary of the government, however, as will be 
detailed later, even this transfer scheme does not work as it was intended. 
 
All three districts use a capitation system for primary health care providers. In both 
Tabanan and East Sumba, hospitals are reimbursed through a fee-for-service system, 
but the Dinas Kesehatan in Purbalingga has decided to make a capitation payment to 
the hospital to improve cost-containment. Over the past few years, however, the 
capitation payment for the RSUD has doubled as the capitation set in previous years 
proved to be insufficient. Hospital management are reluctant to predict whether this 
years’ capitation will be enough. They expect that this year’s expenditure will be 
closer to the capitation payment, but this will not reduce the deficit they 
                                                 
3 A real insurance scheme would have the characteristics of insurance, such as: the premium would be 
calculated based on actuarial analyses, there would be cost control mechanisms such as co-insurance, 
deductibles, and exclusions and prospective customers would have the right to freely select the 
insurance scheme they want based on their own preferences and needs. By and large, these 
characteristics were not present in JPK-Gakin schemes and even when they exist on paper (such as 
cost-control mechanisms), they were not always enforced in practice. 
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accumulated over previous years. Typically, the DinKes and the Bapel set the 
capitation level once a year, when the terms of the JPK-Gakin scheme are reviewed. 
 
These two reimbursement methods can largely influence the incentives of health 
care providers to perform their duties diligently. A capitation payment can have a 
large influence on cost-containment, the risk lies with the health care provider who 
has to give good quality care for a defined budget. This can have a negative impact 
on quality of services. On the other hand, fee-for-service does not have this 
limitation and thus does not give an incentive for the provider to contain costs 
and/or services. As a result health care expenditures can increase significantly, which 
results in increased pressure on (in this case) the government budget. 
 
One observation we can make of the schemes in these districts is that there seems 
to be a lack of efficiency in the use of JPK-Gakin funds by health providers 
(especially at RSUD).4 While the payment system is supposed to be largely 
operating on a capitation basis, in practice, health providers (both puskesmas and 
hospitals) charge for their services on a FFS (fee-for-service) basis. Bapel paid 
virtually all of the providers’ claims and it is not clear whether they have verified 
the claims carefully before approving them.5 As long as the payment system is 
operating de-facto as a FFS, cost control would not be achieved and the use of 
appropriate health services/treatments might be discouraged in favor of more 
expensive ones that might not be absolutely necessary for patients (e.g., using 
patented rather than generic drugs). 
 
Another concern for us is that JPK-Gakin funding in the districts that have piloted it 
(including in the three districts used for this study) largely depends on subsidies from 
the fuel subsidy compensation (PKPS-BBM) scheme and from the general block 
grant (Dana Alokasi Umum – DAU) given by central government to district/local 
governments, which largely funds the local government budget (APBD). On average, 
over 80% of JPK-Gakin funding comes from these two sources.6 Funding from 
member’s premiums and other local tax revenues (Pendapatan Asli Daerah – PAD) 
only form a small part of the program’s total funding. 
 
If this funding pattern continues, it is feared that in the long run, funding for JPK-
Gakin could be cut as the amount of PKPS-BBM and DAU grants to these districts is 
reduced. As these grants are reduced, service delivery for JPK-Gakin patients could 
be compromised as well. It is suggested that local governments should start planning 
alternative financing means to make the JPK-Gakin scheme self-financed and less 
dependent on the above two grants, either by requiring Gakin participants to make a 
financial contribution into the scheme, or through other local taxes that would not 
                                                 
4 In the three districts surveyed, more than 80% of JPK-GAKIN expenditures were spent at RSUD, 
while the number of RSUD users is less than 1% of Gakin members. 
5 In Purbalingga, the head of Bapel is also a physician at the public hospital, where Gakin patients are 
referred. While he defends this practice as useful since he could “verified the hospital claims directly,” 
to other observers this practice violates conflict-of-interest rules.  
6 Except in Purbalingga, where, thanks to the premiums paid by better off members of its insurance 
scheme, only about 70% of the scheme’s funding comes from central and local government subsidies. 
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cause disruptions to the welfare of citizens and businesses alike (for instance, by 
taxing alcoholic beverages and cigarettes). 
 
In all the three districts surveyed, primary care providers (puskesmas) are reimbursed 
through capitation payments. Puskesmas capitation funds are used to pay for the 
treatment of poor outpatients. Expenses for in-patient care and small operations are 
reimbursed on a FFS basis instead of being covered by capitation funds. 
 
The costs at the puskesmas are so much lower than private doctors and hospitals 
because the services provided at the puskesmas are first of all much cheaper than 
those provided at the hospital, but a second more important reason is that the 
puskesmas services are already highly subsidized. The puskesmas in all districts already 
receive subsidies from central, provincial and district governments for the 
expenditures of the puskesmas. Puskesmas have different financial resources, the major 
ones are the following: 
1. District government budget (APBD II); most of these funds (more than 80%) come 
from the central government’s general block grant (Dana Alokasi Umum-DAU); 
2. puskesmas income from user’s fees; 
3. JPK-Gakin capitation payments; and 
4. claims on PT Askes for the treatment of Askes members (normally civil servants). 
 
Looking at the financing of the puskesmas it becomes obvious that the funds from 
JPK-Gakin are more than enough to finance the health services of the poor. In fact, 
they have unspent monies that cannot be used for other than health service 
provision for the poor as these are tied funds. Sometimes the puskesmas have ideas on 
how to use the money to improve the quality of the puskesmas services, but they 
could not use the unspent portion of the JPK-Gakin subsidy to finance such 
improvements, since it would be in breach of the scheme’s regulations. 
 
On the other hand, the hospitals we visited have to struggle to cover their costs. A 
few of them have a large deficit. For instance, the Tabanan hospital has a deficit of 
Rp780 million. This is despite the fact that in fiscal year 2003, only 0.3% of Gakin 
citizens eligible to receive free treatment at the hospital actually visited it (113 
people out of 37,791 eligible Gakins). In the same fiscal year, the hospital received 
Rp1.8 billion to treat Gakin patients. Since the hospital is still running deficits, it is 
most likely that this subsidy was not used efficiently to treat those targeted for the 
subsidy. It is likely that it was used to upgrade the buildings and medical equipment 
of the hospital7 and to subsidize other hospital patients, especially those coming 
from upper income brackets. The hospital was not audited by the local government 
(either DinKes or other entities), since it was an “independent” (but quasi-public) 
entity. Its financial reports were sent directly to PT Askes and PT Askes declined to 
make them public.8 
 
                                                 
7 The hospital recently moved to a brand new building and the equipment is considered to be state-of-
the-art for a district hospital. 
8 Unlike in Purbalingga and East Sumba, our research team failed to receive detailed financial data 
about Tabanan’s JPK-Gakin scheme, either from the Dinas Kesehatan, PT Askes or the hospital. 
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These observations show that there is evidence that the JPK-Gakin funds were not 
used efficiently, were often leaked to non-poor patients, and were not carefully 
monitored and audited by appropriate authorities. We will elaborate on these in the 
next section. 
 
D.  GAKIN UTILIZATION: IS THE FUND DISTRIBUTION PRO-POOR? 
 
Utilization data shows how many members of a health-financing scheme actually use 
the services it provides. It gives us a clue on whether or not the financing scheme was 
used mostly to fund the health care of its members. It also tells us how confident are 
members of the health financing scheme in the quality of services it provides and, 
hence, their willingness to use it. 
 
A high utilization rate shows that the scheme is mostly used by its members and that 
they have a high level of confidence in it and are therefore willing to use it. On the 
other hand, a low utilization rate means that the scheme’s members do not have 
much confidence in it and decline to use it. In this case, it is more likely that the 
funds allocated by the scheme are used to benefit non-members. 
 
Our study indicates that the actual utilization rate of JPK-Gakin members who 
actually obtain health services from the selected health providers is still quite low 
(especially at hospitals), as illustrated in Table 3 below:  
 
Table 3: Average Annual Utilization Rate of Gakin Members 
in the Three Districts Surveyed 
 Purbalingga Tabanan East Sumba 
Puskesmas 38.28% 31.70% 16.02% 
Hospital 0.12% 0.30% 0.22% 
Source: authors’ calculation based on district data received. 
 
This low utilization rate shows that members of the JPK-Gakin scheme were 
reluctant to use it, even though local officials have told them that they will get free 
treatment at the selected health facilities. Based on our analyses, the low utilization 
rate of JPK-Gakin members could be attributed to the following: 
 
• The cost of transportation for poor citizens (gakin) from their homes to the puskesmas. 
Even when they receive free treatment at the puskesmas, they have to pay for their 
transportation costs themselves, since it could not be reimbursed by JPK-Gakin. The 
transportation cost is much higher than the puskesmas’ user charges (and with JPK-
Gakin, these charges were waived). A one-way trip to a puskesmas could cost 
Rp10,000, while the treatment itself costs nothing for the Gakin. Thus, there is an 
additional cost in attending the puskesmas that discourages some Gakin members from 
seeking treatment at puskesmas. 
 
• Some Gakin members have not received their JPK-Gakin membership card, 
discouraging them from seeking treatment at puskesmas since they were afraid that 
they would be denied treatment if they do not have the new card. In fact, in 
Purbalingga we observed that premium paying members of the insurance scheme 
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tend to obtain their membership card more quickly than the non-paying Gakin 
members, indicating that services are better if one actually pays for it rather than if it 
is freely available. 
 
• There is a common perception within the community that the quality of health 
services in puskesmas and public hospitals (RSUD) is poor and that the staff of 
these facilities do not treat patients courteously. As a result, some Gakin members 
interviewed stated that they prefer to use private providers, such as traditional 
healers, private doctors etc. Such services are, however, not reimbursable under 
the JPK-Gakin scheme, which only covers services provided by government-
owned facilities such as puskesmas and RSUD. Thus, if one wants to get the best 
health care from the providers they trust the most, their choice would be very 
limited under JPK-Gakin. Many Gakin members choose not to use the scheme 
altogether and continue to use the service of private providers even when they 
charge high consultation fees, since they have more confidence in these private 
providers that they will get the best health services available to them. 
 
The low utilization rate of Gakin members also indicates that most of the JPK-Gakin 
funds allocated to puskesmas and RSUD were actually not used to fund the health 
services of poor families, but instead were used to subsidize the health care of other 
customers of these facilities who are financially better-off. One example of this could 
be seen in Purbalingga. In Table 4 below, we can see that the monthly utilization rate 
of the Gakin members of the district’s insurance scheme (JPKM) were the following: 
 
Table 4: Average Monthly Utilization Rate of Gakin Members  
in Purbalingga District, Fiscal Year 2002/2003 
Type of Services Number of Visits per month Utilization Rate (in %) 
Outpatient Service  
(Puskesmas and RSUD Outpatient) 
6,404 3.19
In-patient Service (RSUD) 12 0.01
Maternity 60 0.03
Emergency 98 0.05
Referral to RSUD 278 0.14
Source: authors’ calculation based on districts data. 
 
Table 5 shows that while Gakin members received more than 57% of the JPKM funds 
allocated by the district government, they only use about 21% of the puskesmas 
health services and 12.37% of the services offered by the local public hospital 
(RSUD). This indicates that most of the JPK-Gakin funds allocated in the 
Purbalingga district were not used to fund health services of poor persons living in 
the district, but instead were used to subsidize other operational costs of the 
puskesmas and RSUD, specifically subsidizing other users of these facilities who are 
better-off financially than Gakin members (i.e. the premium-paying members of the 
JPKM insurance scheme).9 
                                                 
9 The Bapel head in Purbalingga admitted that at this time, better-off members of the JPKM insurance 
scheme (Strata II and III) were subsidized by the Gakin members (Strata I) rather than the reverse, 
although he hopes that this situation can be turned around “sometime in the near future.” 
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Table 5: Distribution of JPKM Funds in Purbalingga District 
Percentage of JPKM funds allocated to Gakin. 57.02% 
Percentage of JPKM funds allocated to non- Gakin. 42.98% 
  
Percentage of puskesmas funds allocated to Gakin patients. 20.92% 
Percentage of puskesmas funds allocated to non- Gakin patients. 79.08% 
   
Percentage of RSUD funds allocated to Gakin patients 12.37% 
Percentage of RSUD funds allocated to non-Gakin patients 87.63% 
Source: authors’ calculation. 
 
Finally, when we calculated the unit cost per JPK-Gakin user in the two districts for 
which we have financial data (East Sumba and Purbalingga), we found that the 
average cost of treatment for each JPK-Gakin patient in these districts is quite high, 
especially at hospital level. As we can see from Table 6 below, it costs Rp7,122,559 
to treat each Gakin patient in RSUD Purbalingga and Rp480,505 to treat each 
Gakin patient in the East Sumba hospitals (RSUD East Sumba and the Lindimara 
hospitals). It is inconceivable that the patient’s costs reflected in this calculation all 
went to treat JPK-Gakin members, thus, it is possible that a significant portion of 
funds were “leaked” for the treatment of non-poor patients in these hospitals. 
Indeed, the hospitals said that the Gakin subsidies allocated by the Bapel were fully 
absorbed by them and yet, both of them are almost running financial deficits. It 
could be assumed, therefore, that most Gakin funds were used to subsidize other 
hospital operations rather than the servicing of Gakin patients. 
 
Table 6a: JPK-Gakin Unit Cost/User Ratio in East Sumba District 
Type of Services Annual Utilization 
(in %) 
# of Users per 
Year 
JPK-Gakin 
Allocation  
(in Rp) 
Unit 
Cost/User 
Puskesmas services 16.02% 252,779 1,663,000,500 6,579 
Hospital services 0.22% 3,408 1,637,560,000 480,505 
 
Table 6b: JPK-Gakin Unit Cost/User Ratio in Purbalingga District 
Type of Services Annual Utilization 
(in %) 
# of Users per 
Year 
JPK-Gakin 
Allocation 
(in Rp) 
Unit 
Cost/User 
Puskesmas services 38.28% 76,844 804,144,000 10,465 
Hospital services 0.12% 145 1,033,206,000 7,125,559
 
In other words, despite the goal of JPK-Gakin to help poor Indonesians receive the 
health care they need, the distribution of the JPK-Gakin subsidy is pro-rich rather 
than pro-poor. This might not be the most efficient way to provide health coverage 
for poor citizens, since most of its intended targets never use these services and those 
that actually use them might actually be able to fund most, if not all of their own 
health expenditures. 
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If the JPK-Gakin scheme were to be called truly pro-poor, the trend of subsidizing the 
health care of the non-poor at the expense of the poor has to be reversed, but doing 
so would require a major change in the way the JPK-Gakin scheme is organized and 
operated. This issue will be addressed in our policy recommendation section. 
 
E.  MEMBERS’ IDENTIFICATION AND SOCIALIZATION 
 
In a “normal” insurance situation people will acquire insurance by themselves if they 
are interested. In the case of JPK-Gakin, however, the premium for members is 
automatically paid by a third party (the government) so health insurance is, 
effectively, a free service for them. This does not necessarily mean that those people 
eligible to the service will instantly present themselves to the insurance provider. 
There is a need to identify people eligible for the program and make them aware of 
the benefits of the program so that they comply and avail themselves of their rights. 
Since the insurance package has been pre-paid by a third party, there is no financial 
incentive for the insurer to perform this function or to do it well. At the same time, 
members do not have an adequate incentive to find out more about their rights under 
the insurance scheme. 
 
Because the JPK-Gakin scheme is fully administered by local governments, each 
district has the task of identifying the poor. In the three districts visited the DinKes 
has assumed this responsibility. In general, all three districts make use of the vertical 
structure of the DinKes (puskesmas staff, village head and bidan desa). From our field 
observations, however, we concluded that without additional help at the village level 
an accurate identification of the poor is very difficult. Each Dinas Kesehatan should, 
therefore, make use of village informants for this purpose. 
 
There are several factors that determine the number of community members 
participating in JPK-Gakin: 
1. The influence of marketing methods and the ability of local activists in 
promoting the scheme at community level (kaders, midwives and village officials). 
The marketing methods, skills and motivation of kaders largely influences 
whether or not people will enroll in the scheme. In areas where the kaders are 
highly motivated and active, people are more likely to be enrolled in the scheme, 
whereas this is not the case in areas where the kaders play a more subdued role. 
This might be the most effective way to socialize the scheme, and this will be 
elaborated upon further in the next section. 
2. The ability of the community to receive and understand information given to 
them, whether orally or in writing. This might relate to their education level. 
3. Community perception of puskesmas services (cost/fees, facilities available, service 
quality, effectiveness of medication/drugs, etc). 
4. The influence of conventional promotion and marketing efforts conducted by 
Bapels (flyers, leaflets, radio and newspaper ads, etc.). This method is, however, 
quite expensive and often is not effective. 
 
Identification using village-level informants has been used in the Purbalingga District 
since the JPK-Gakin scheme started there in 2002. This is done by the so-called 
“village volunteers” (kaders) who play a major role in the identification, verification 
and socialization processes. Typical kaders are the wives of the local Household 
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Association (Rukun Tetangga-RT) Head or the wives of an important member of the 
community, such as a teacher, a religious leader (ulama) or a civil servant. Kaders 
operate at the grassroots of the community and at least one kader has been identified 
in each RT.10 
 
Using kaders reduces the barriers of communication with the community and also the 
costs of performing the identification. This is because kaders live within the 
community and thus know many of the community members. Secondly, kaders have 
ready access to information needed to identify the poor, and finally, community 
members are more likely to consider information received from kaders more seriously 
than those that were communicated by government officials, who often do not live in 
the community and have more distant and impersonal relationships with community 
members compared with kaders. Since kaders have closer relations with prospective 
members living in their community and tend to be well respected by the community, 
this might have contributed to the high level of membership in Purbalingga’s JPK-
Gakin scheme (nearly two-thirds of Purbalingga citizens by the end of 2004). 
 
Kaders also have extensive powers in determining which prospective members should 
be classified as poor and which ones as non-poor. While they receive a prospective 
member’s list made by the Bapel, they have the authority to verify and adapt it if 
necessary. When kaders make modifications to the prospective members’ list, neither 
the Bapel nor the puskesmas usually challenge them. This indicates the influence of 
kaders’ judgement in determining members of the insurance scheme. 
 
On the other hand, the DinKes in both East Sumba and Tabanan has not used the 
kader system as extensively as Purbalingga. In East Sumba, the identification is 
carried out by the puskesmas staff, bidan desa (village midwives), and the village head 
and his/her assistants. During the first period (2003), there were many complaints 
and requests from people eligible for JPK-Gakin who had not received their insurance 
cards. Changes were subsequently made in 2004 to include additional village level 
helpers which resulted in a better outcome (and higher level of poverty) and higher 
level of satisfaction in the second phase of the pilot. Still the DinKes and members of 
the Bapel acknowledge that there are problems with the identification process, and 
that the criteria that are currently used are not very useful. In Tabanan, the 
identification of the poor was performed within a period of three months by DinKes 
staff, the village head, the dusun head and members of the puskesmas. After the initial 
year they realized that this process was not very effective and had a number of 
weaknesses. For next year the plan is to involve the health officials, the village 
midwife and volunteers from each village (kaders) to make identification of the poor 
easier. 
 
The lack of a clear division of roles in the socialization process of the Askes-Gakin 
scheme in Tabanan seems to have limited the success of the program. Unlike the 
case of Purbalingga, the village midwife and kaders play no role in the socialization of 
health insurance for the poor in Tabanan. In this district the socialization is mainly 
through the Kepala Dusun (Kelian Dinas) who would explain the scheme to the poor 
in their neighborhood. To conclude, the socialization of the Askes–Gakin scheme in 
                                                 
10 Each RT unit consists of 20 to 30 households. 
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Tabanan appears to be rather minimal. Many village heads who received health 
insurance cards to be distributed to the people did not know what they were for. In 
addition, feedback from people in the neighborhoods indicates that the majority of 
citizens have not heard about the scheme. 
 
We can conclude that for both the identification and socialization of prospective JPK-
Gakin members, the related stakeholders need to be identified and the existence of a 
clear process increases its accuracy. Looking at the identification process, it seems that to 
maximize accuracy in identifying prospective members at grassroots level, it is necessary 
to have enumerators who live with the prospective members and are well informed about 
their economic and social conditions. This has been done by Purbalingga. By using well-
respected community members as kaders in the identification and socialization process, 
they were able to socialize the JPK-Gakin program in the district very well. Since nearly 
two-thirds of Purbalingga citizens are current members of the insurance scheme, this 
seems to indicate that the kader’s efforts contributed greatly to the high rate of 
enrollment. 
 
F.  MONITORING AND COORDINATION OF STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Financial monitoring of the JPK-Gakin program is supposed to be done by the 
District Auditing Board (Badan Pengawas Daerah-Bawasda), while monitoring the 
quality of the health services of the puskesmas and RSUD is done by the Bapel from 
the reports on financial and expenditure data submitted by the puskesmas and 
RSUDs. 
 
Formally, DinKes as part of the Advisory Board of JPKM, is responsible for 
monitoring the work of the Bapel as well as the effect of JPK-Gakin on utilization 
rates and service quality. Health care providers (puskesmas, pustu and hospital) all 
provide monthly reports on utilization rates and expenditures to the DinKes. This 
kind of monitoring is, however, rather limited and does not provide information 
concerning why people do or do not make use of health care services if they need it. 
In addition, quality assessments of health care services in the facilities offering JPK-
Gakin services are not done. 
 
It can be said that the existing monitoring mechanisms were mainly focused on financial 
monitoring alone. All districts studied (East Sumba, Purbalingga and Tabanan) also 
referred to a “Community Complaints Unit” or UPM (“Unit Pengaduan Masyarakat”) 
whose role is to record complaints on JPK-Gakin health services. Nevertheless, this 
cannot be seen as a sufficient mechanism to control the quality of services because the 
UPM does not have a clear policy and authority. In addition, there is no independent 
monitoring of the JPK-Gakin scheme done by the clients or community groups/NGOs 
and such monitoring is not encouraged by the local governments. Thus, the opportunity 
for stakeholders to monitor the accountability and transparency of JPK-Gakin 
expenditures is very limited. 
 
There also appears to be little coordination between involved parties (DinKes, Bapel 
and providers) in monitoring the use and the finances of JPKM. Specifically, it is 
unclear whether the financial and utilization reports submitted by health providers 
were checked and verified by other government agencies (DinKes and Bapel). We 
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found that each “case” (of complaint) would be handled separately by the above 
coordinating team but they do not meet regularly. This kind of “vague” monitoring 
mechanism and coordination could be found in all of the districts studies (East 
Sumba, Purbalingga and Tabanan). 
 
Without careful and continuous monitoring of JPK-Gakin finances, the possibility of 
misallocation and misuse of JPK-Gakin funds for the benefit of those who are not Gakin 
could not be ruled out completely. One should be cautious of the fact that virtually all claims 
for JPK-Gakin services were approved. This might indicate that there has been a lack of 
verification to ensure that the services that were claimed were actually delivered. Without 
such verification, there is a strong possibility that some of these claims have been falsified. 
 
Measuring the level of satisfaction with health care services, especially when they are 
provided for free, is very difficult. When services are provided for free there is less 
likelihood that the clients will complain about those services. In addition, the 
assessment capabilities of a society with a low knowledge of health and health care is 
not a good benchmark. One option to filter complaints is at the community level 
through the kader, but such a system does not seem to have developed here. 
 
G.  THIRD PARTIES’ PARTICIPATION (PRIVATE SECTOR, 
INSURANCE CARRIER, CLIENTS, ETC.) 
 
Private providers 
 
With the exception of a private hospital in East Sumba that is allowed to accept JPK-
Gakin patients, private providers are not included as participants in the JPK-Gakin 
scheme. This reduces the access and choice of JPKM members in their health care, since 
they are only able to use their entitlement at public facilities (puskesmas and RSUD), 
while a large number of citizens, even the poor ones, still prefer to be serviced by private 
providers rather than public ones. This might contribute to the perception of some JPK-
Gakin members that the health services offered by the public providers are inadequate or 
lacking in quality. 
 
Part of the reason why private providers are reluctant to join the scheme is because of 
the large discrepancy between the cost of health services performed at private and 
public facilities. Since public facilities (especially puskesmas) are heavily subsidized by 
the government, prices are kept much lower than the market prices. For instance, the 
user fee at puskesmas in East Sumba is just Rp2,000/person/visit (and is waived for 
Gakin scheme members), while private doctors would charge at least 
Rp20,000/person/visit for general consultations. 
 
In addition, under JPK-Gakin, providers are reimbursed on a capitation basis, while 
virtually every private provider prefers to use a fee-for-service (FFS) arrangement. As 
long as the reimbursement arrangement is still via capitation, it would be very 
difficult to attract private providers to join the JPK-Gakin scheme. On the other 
hand, the FFS arrangement in the long run would not be financially sustainable, 
since providers have an incentive to prescribe expensive treatments and medications 
to their patients, knowing that they would be fully reimbursed by the insurance 
program, resulting in the collapse of the program over the long run. 
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A balanced approach would be to find a way to reimburse private providers either at 
the market price they charge, while containing the cost so that the program would be 
sustainable over the long run. This will be elaborated upon in the policy 
recommendation section. 
 
Insurance Manager/Carrier 
 
The choice of insurance manager/carrier is also becoming more limited, with the 
creation of the PT Askes monopoly to manage the JPK-Gakin scheme, starting on 1 
January 2005. The decision was made by the Health Ministry without advance 
consultation with local governments, Bapels and other stakeholders, creating tensions 
between the Health Ministry, PT Askes and local governments that could potentially 
create disincentives between them to cooperate and coordinate JPK-Gakin operations. 
As a result, in some districts, there might be two JPK-Gakin carriers operating 
simultaneously: PT Askes (funded through the PKPS-BBM grant) and the local JPK-
Gakin scheme (funded through the APBD-DAU grant). This has been the case in East 
Sumba and this could potentially occur in other districts as well. If these two schemes 
continue to exist with little cooperation and consultation between them, the result will 
be confusion among JPK-Gakin members and the possibility that service quality could be 
compromised. 
 
Since the PT Askes benefit package will be uniform in all Indonesian districts, it will 
not take into account local conditions that might necessitate changes in the benefit 
package (for instance, providing health care in a remote rural district). In addition, 
under PT Askes, the beneficiaries would not be able to choose the best insurance 
carrier for themselves, since, under the new government policy, PT Askes would run 
JPK-Gakin as a public monopoly. 
 
Our analysis above shows that local JPK-Gakin schemes tend to offer a better benefit 
package than PT Askes does, and are often better socialized to prospective clients. There 
are also indications that clients are more likely to approach local DinKes or Bapel when 
they have complaints about JPK-Gakin services, but less likely to approach PT Askes, 
which is perceived to be a central government institution which is more bureaucratic 
and distant from them. Thus, it might be necessary for the government to rethink its 
plan to entrust the management of JPK-Gakin to PT Askes, and instead create a plan 
where PT Askes and district governments work more closely in providing JPK-Gakin 
services in which the district will have more authority to change the benefit package of 
JPK-Gakin to make it more accommodative to local conditions. 
 
Members/clients 
 
There is little involvement of JPK-Gakin members/clients in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of the scheme. JPKM members are just passive 
clients who were registered, paid the premium, received a membership card and 
obtained health services from JPK-Gakin providers. They do not participate in the 
decision-making of the scheme itself.  
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Of course, some members did file complaints to the DinKes and Bapel when they 
received unsatisfactory services, however, one has to be a very assertive person in 
doing so, taking the initiative to file the complaint, following them up and so forth. 
Without doing this, it is unlikely that the complaint will receive a positive response 
from the scheme managers. Finally, JPK-Gakin members’ participation is limited to 
filing complaints when receiving unsatisfactory services from the health providers. 
They are/were not involved in the design, implementation or monitoring of the 
program. This makes the management of the program less transparent and 
accountable to its stakeholders, especially its members. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Based on our research findings, we can conclude that the JPK-Gakin scheme has 
been more successful in providing access to adequate health care coverage for 
members of the population, especially the poor in comparison to previous health 
financing schemes promoted in Indonesia. This is because JPK-Gakin is 
administered and managed by local governments (the funding is shared between 
central and local government budgets). Thus, it is easier for the government to 
develop innovations within the scheme, dealing with problems and members’ 
complaints, and taking into account local conditions that might affect health care 
delivery in a particular region (for example, very remote regions or regions that are 
vulnerable to periodic epidemics such as malaria). 
 
The scheme needs to be improved in several ways, however, in order to enhance its 
effectiveness, improve its efficiency and improve the quality of services received by 
its beneficiaries/clients. There are several problems that need to be addressed 
immediately by the DinKes, the Bapel and health providers. 
 
If these problems are not rectified, they could hinder the effectiveness of JPK-Gakin 
in delivering its service to its members/clients: 
• There seems to be a lack of efficiency in the management of JPK-Gakin funds by 
health providers (especially at RSUD). Claims were approved with little 
verification and inspection to ensure that they were accurate and there are 
indications that most of the funds were used to subsidize the care of non-poor 
patients rather than the poor ones who were supposed to benefit (see below). 
Making the scheme better targeted towards the poor should become the 
government’s priority if the goal of the program to make health services more 
accessible to the poor is to be realized. 
 
• There appear to be a number of formal and informal barriers that have the effect 
of discouraging some Gakin members from using the services to which they are 
entitled. These include high transportation costs, the delay in the distribution of 
their membership card, etc. Such barriers might discourage the poor from using 
JPK-Gakin services, and combined with the existing perception about the quality 
of government-provided health facilities, could make many JPK-Gakin members 
reluctant to seek treatment in these facilities. 
 
• The low utilization rate of JPK-Gakin members using the services they are 
entitled to results in the misallocation of Gakin subsidies to the supposedly 
better-off members, who could actually afford to pay some of their own health 
care costs. It is likely that most of these funds were used instead to upgrade the 
buildings and medical equipment of the hospital and to subsidize other hospital 
patients, especially those coming from upper income brackets. For instance, in 
Purbalingga it is estimated that 79% of the JPK-Gakin funds subsidize the 
health care services of non-poor at puskesmas and at the local public hospital 
(RSUD) with 87.63% of overall JPK-Gakin funds being expended on non-poor 
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patients. In order for the JPK-Gakin scheme to become truly pro-poor, this 
misallocation needs to be addressed. 
 
• There is little involvement of non-government stakeholders, and JPK-Gakin 
members/clients in particular in the design, implementation and monitoring of 
the scheme. JPK-Gakin members are passive clients who do not participate in the 
decision-making of the scheme itself. This makes the management of the program 
less transparent and accountable to its stakeholders, especially its members. 
 
• With the exception of East Sumba, there is no involvement of private health 
providers in the provision of health services for JPK-Gakin members. They are 
only able to seek health services in publicly managed health facilities (puskesmas 
and RSUD). The fact that most private providers do not participate in the 
scheme results in a more limited choice of health providers available for its 
members, which could deny them access to better quality services. 
 
• The choice of insurance manager/carrier is also becoming more limited, with the 
creation of the PT Askes monopoly to manage the JPK-Gakin scheme. The 
decision was made by MoH without advance consultation with local 
governments, Bapels and other stakeholders, creating tensions between MoH, PT 
Askes, and these stakeholders that could potentially create disincentives between 
them to cooperate and coordinate JPK-Gakin operations. 
 
• JPK-Gakin funding largely depends on subsidies from the fuel subsidy compensation 
(PKPS-BBM) scheme and from the general block grant (Dana Alokasi Umum – 
DAU) given by central government to district/local governments that largely funds 
the local government budget (APBD). Funding from other sources (e.g. member’s 
premiums) only forms a small part of the program’s overall funding. In the long run, 
this might make the scheme unsustainable as PKPS-BBM and DAU grants are 
reduced, creating potential disruptions in the delivery of services. 
 
• Other than the required quarterly financial reports, there is little monitoring 
done by the Bapel and DinKes on the use of JPK-Gakin funds by providers. Thus, 
it is not known whether all the reimbursement claims made by the providers are 
made for services actually provided. This could provide the opportunity to misuse 
the funds through the submission of fraudulent claims. 
 
• Coordination between related government agencies (DinKes, Bapel, and health 
providers) could be improved further. While in these three districts there are 
efforts to coordinate the operation of the JPK-Gakin scheme, the outcome has 
not yet been optimized and turf-battles and finger-pointing between these 
agencies when problems arise are still common. 
 
Table 7 below summarizes the main findings of this study. 
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Table 7: Summary of the Characteristics of JPK-Gakin Programs 
in the Three Districts Surveyed 
 East Sumba Purbalingga Tabanan 
Program background District-run program 
starting in 2003. Only 
available for poor 
citizens. 
District-run program 
starting in 2002. 
Available for both 
Gakin and higher 
income citizens, the 
latter pays a premium. 
District-run program 
starting in April 2004. 
Run by PT Askes. Only 
available for poor 
citizens. 
Scheme manager/ 
carrier 
Local health 
maintenance agency 
(Bapel). Since 1 January 
2005, PT Askes 
manages the scheme, 
although the Bapel still 
run the scheme for the 
rural areas.  
Local health 
maintenance agency 
(Bapel). Since 1 January 
2005, PT Askes 
manages the scheme. 
PT Askes since the 
scheme was introduced 
in April 2004. 
Health providers 
available for scheme 
members 
Puskesmas, village 
midwives (bidan desa), 
district government-
owned hospital 
(RSUD), and a private-
religious hospital (there 
are only 2 hospitals in 
the district). No private 
doctors. 
Puskesmas, village 
midwives (bidan desa), 
and RSUD. No private 
doctors/hospitals. 
Puskesmas, village 
midwives (bidan desa), 
and RSUD. No private 
doctors/hospitals. 
Role of private health 
providers (private 
doctors, hospitals, 
clinics, etc). 
Limited. Private 
hospital could 
participate in the 
scheme and accept 
Gakin patients, but 
private doctors could 
not. 
Non-existent. Scheme 
only opens for 
government-run 
puskesmas and hospital 
(RSUD). 
Non-existent. Scheme 
only opens for 
government-run  
puskesmas and hospital 
(RSUD). 
Funding sources 58.5% from central 
government (PKPS-
BBM (oil subsidy 
compensation) grant), 
41.5% from district’s 
APBD (DAU block 
grant) 
56% from district’s 
APBD (DAU grant), 
13% from the central 
government (PKPS-
BBM grant), 28.5% 
from non-Gakin 
premium contributions, 
2.5% from other sources 
(interest income, etc). 
No relevant financial 
data were obtained. 
Number of members of 
the JPK-Gakin scheme 
129,074 poor citizens 
(66.55% of the district’s 
population). 
229,448 poor citizens 
(27.91% of the district’s 
population), plus 
263,746 non-poor 
citizens who joined the 
scheme by paying 
premiums. 
37,791 poor citizens 
(9% of the district’s 
population). 
Average annual 
utilization rate 
16.02% for puskesmas, 
0.22% for hospitals. 
38.28% for puskesmas, 
0.12% for the RSUD. 
21.75% for puskesmas, 
0.3% for the RSUD. 
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 East Sumba Purbalingga Tabanan 
Is the scheme pro-
poor? 
No, the RSUD receives 
Rp1.6 billion to treat 
Gakin patients. 
However, only 0.22% of 
eligible poor citizens 
that could receive free 
treatment at the 
hospital actually visited 
it (284 people out of 
129,074 eligible 
Gakins). 
No, it is estimated that 
79% of the JPK-Gakin 
funds goes to subsidize 
the health care services 
of non-poor at 
puskesmas. At RSUD, 
87.63% of the JPK-
Gakin funds go to non-
poor patients. 
No, the RSUD receives 
Rp1.8 billion to treat 
Gakin patients. 
However, only 0.3% of 
eligible poor citizens 
that could receive free 
treatment at the 
hospital actually visited 
it (113 people out of 
37,791 eligible Gakins). 
Marketing and 
socialization 
Socialization is done by 
the puskesmas staff, bidan 
desa (village midwives), 
and the village head and 
his/her assistants. 
Socialization is done by 
the puskesmas staff, 
village midwives, and 
village volunteers 
(kaders) who live among 
the targeted community. 
Considered to be a more 
active and successful 
socialization campaign 
than the ones held by 
the other two districts. 
Socialization is mainly 
through the Kepala 
Dusun (Kelian Dinas) 
The village midwife and 
kader play no role in the 
socialization of health 
insurance for the poor 
in Tabanan. As a result, 
the socialization of the 
Askes–Gakin scheme in 
this district appears to 
be rather minimal. 
Members’/clients’ role 
and involvement in the 
scheme’s governance 
Minimal, limited to 
lodging complaints 
whenever they receive 
unsatisfactory services. 
Not involved or 
consulted during the 
planning, 
implementation, and 
monitoring stages. 
Minimal, limited to 
lodging complaints 
whenever they receive 
unsatisfactory services 
(and for non-poor 
customers, paying the 
premium). Not involved 
or consulted during the 
planning, 
implementation, and 
monitoring stages. 
Minimal, limited to 
lodging complaints 
whenever they receive 
unsatisfactory services. 
Not involved or 
consulted during the 
planning, 
implementation, and 
monitoring stages. 
Monitoring and 
auditing 
Officially, done by the 
District Auditing Board 
(Badan Pengawas 
Daerah-Bawasda) and by 
Bapel, which in turn are 
supervised by Dinas 
Kesehatan (DinKes). 
However, in practice, 
extensive monitoring 
was not done. Bapel and 
DinKes just accept 
whatever financial 
reports and claims are 
submitted by health 
providers. 
Officially, done by the 
District Auditing Board 
(Badan Pengawas 
Daerah-Bawasda) and by 
Bapel, which in turn are 
supervised by Dinas 
Kesehatan (DinKes). 
However, in practice, 
extensive monitoring 
was not done. Bapel and 
DinKes just accept 
whatever financial 
reports and claims are 
submitted by health 
providers. 
Officially, done by the 
District Auditing Board 
(Badan Pengawas 
Daerah-Bawasda) and by 
Bapel, which in turn are 
supervised by Dinas 
Kesehatan (DinKes). 
However, in practice, 
extensive monitoring 
was not done. Bapel and 
DinKes just accept 
whatever financial 
reports and claims are 
submitted by health 
providers. 
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
To address these problems and to make the JPK-Gakin scheme work better, the 
following recommendations should be implemented by the government, Bapel, health 
providers and other stakeholders. We have targeted these recommendations at the 
local government that manages and implements the JPK-Gakin scheme, as well as 
the central government (Ministry of Health) that would supervise and provide policy 
advice to the local implementers. We have divided these recommendations into 
short, medium and long-term recommendations, based on our assessments of how 
long it would take to implement them. Most of these recommendations would be 
implemented by local governments, after consultation with the central government, 
the private sector, NGOs and, most importantly, their citizens who are the 
beneficiaries of the JPK-Gakin scheme. 
 
Short-term recommendations (implemented within the next 1 year): 
• Increase coordination between different government agencies, especially between 
DinKes and PT Askes in managing JPK-Gakin delivery at the local level. 
Coordination should be done continuously and not just be limited to formal 
monthly meetings and quarterly financial reports. PT Askes officials  and DinKes 
officials should work closely together (perhaps in the same office) to resolve a 
situation or problem within the scheme immediately after it has been identified. 
 
• Create clear guidelines on the functions, duties and responsibilities of each 
government agency in administering the JPK-Gakin scheme at the local level. 
DinKes (with the help of puskesmas, village heads and kaders) could be tasked 
with collecting updated information regularly about Gakin members, distributing 
the membership cards, and monitoring the financial management of the scheme. 
PT Askes would be tasked with paying out reimbursement claims of health 
providers; and health providers (puskesmas and RSUD) would provide health 
services to Gakin members. With such guidelines, the functions of each agencies 
would be clarified and turf-battles between them could be avoided. 
 
• Eliminate formal and informal barriers for Gakin families to use the services to 
which they are entitled. This could be achieved for instance by speeding up the 
distribution of Gakin membership cards and by providing some transportation 
subsidies for Gakin patients. The government also needs to eliminate the 
misallocation of Gakin subsidies to higher income groups, to ensure that the JPK-
Gakin scheme truly meets its intended purpose to provide health financing for 
poor families. 
 
• Improve the efficiency of health services delivery by health providers (puskesmas and 
RSUD). Health services given to JPK-Gakin members should be appropriate to their 
needs and should be medically necessary. For instance, the use of more expensive but 
not medically necessary services/treatments (such as patented drugs) should be 
limited by the imposition of efficiency-controlling mechanisms. Stricter monitoring 
procedures should be introduced to ensure that Gakin funds are used as efficiently as 
possible and that all the expended funds are actually accounted for. 
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• Improve the quality of services provided by puskesmas. Many citizens perceive 
puskesmas to have poor quality services, and thus, they are not willing to seek 
primary health care treatment there. Incentives to improve the quality of health 
service delivery at puskesmas should be introduced. At the same time, however, 
puskesmas should not use such incentives to increase the salaries or to pay out 
cash bonuses to puskesmas staff. 
 
• Improve socialization/marketing techniques to recruit new JPK-Gakin members, 
using low-cost mass-marketing tools that would have wide credibility among 
prospective clients. Kaders might be a potential tool for such socialization 
purposes. Incentives could be created to make kaders more productive in 
recruiting new members. This could include a regular honorarium for kaders that 
is higher than the current financial incentives available to them. 
 
Medium-term recommendations (implemented within one to two years): 
• Reactivate puskesmas’ activities at the village level (especially in remote 
districts), for instance, through reintroducing mobile health clinics (puskesmas 
keliling) or by training village level health providers (such as alternative healers 
(dukun) so that they are able to provide first-aid medical assistance to villagers in 
cases of more serious medical emergency when doctors and other health 
practitioners are absent from the puskesmas travelling in the puskesmas keliling 
(mobile clinic). These village providers would also be able to provide referrals to 
the puskesmas in cases where they could not treat the patients due to the 
seriousness of the patient’s medical condition. By doing this, it is hoped that 
access to health facilities at the village level can be improved and that citizens do 
not have to seek treatment at puskesmas unless their conditions cannot be treated 
at the village level. 
 
• Implement measures to increase the participation rate of JPK-Gakin members’ in the 
planning, implementation and monitoring of the scheme. The members should be 
allowed a voice in the decision-making process affecting their welfare and their 
membership in the JPK-Gakin scheme. The creation of a JPK-Gakin members’ 
association at grassroots level might be the first step to achieving this goal. 
 
• Provide stricter monitoring (both internal and external) to ensure that the JPK-
Gakin funds allocated to provide health services at RSUD and puskesmas are 
spent effectively and efficiently. The monitoring should be done both by Bapel 
(or Bawasda) and also by an independent monitoring unit that could be set up by 
an NGO/CSO, by the community or by a JPK-Gakin members’ association. 
 
• Consider including private providers (e.g. private doctors, private hospitals and 
health clinics) in the list of providers of the JPK-Gakin scheme. This would 
increase the choice of providers for members of the scheme and would improve 
their access to needed health services. In order to attract private providers into 
the scheme, higher reimbursement payments set close to the market rate might be 
necessary so that the payment would be in line with the rate charged by private 
providers. This might, however, require premium increases that might force some 
JPK-Gakin members to drop out of the scheme because they could no longer 
afford the premium. 
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• Consider ending the monopoly of PT Askes as the insurance carrier for the JPK-
Gakin scheme and open the selection of insurance carrier to a competitive 
bidding process done by each local government. These companies would run the 
financial management, claims and reimbursement of the Gakin funds in each 
region, while local governments (DinKes) would continue to issue appropriate 
regulations and monitor how the program is operated. All insurance companies 
(both state and privately owned) should be allowed to participate in this bidding 
process and given a chance to manage the JPK-Gakin scheme based on their 
previous achievements and their ability to service their clients efficiently. 
 
Long-term recommendations (implemented in three or more years): 
• Efforts need to be taken to reduce or eliminate the dependency of the JPK-Gakin 
scheme on the PKPS-BBM and APBD-DAU grants to make it self-financing 
through premiums or other contributions from members/clients, either through 
increasing premiums for better-off non-Gakin members or by introducing new 
taxes to fund the scheme (e.g. by introducing local cigarette and liquor taxes). Of 
course, efforts need to be taken to ensure that this measure does not reduce 
members’ access to health services they need and would not disrupt local 
economic activity or affect the local labor market. 
 
• Consider charging a minimum premium rate (or co-insurance) for JPK-Gakin 
members, since it seems that paying Gakin members are more likely to demand 
better services from the providers than non-paying ones and are more likely to 
complain when these services are not delivered to their satisfaction. Of course, 
the charges imposed on Gakin members should be set at an appropriate minimum 
level so that they would not drop out from the JPK-Gakin scheme altogether due 
to affordability issues. This has been done in the Rembang District where Gakin 
members are required to pay a premium of Rp5,000/person/year to receive their 
program benefits. It has been quite successful, because the poor pay a small 
portion of their premium they are more inclined to monitor the service quality of 
their health services and to complain if they think they are receiving 
unsatisfactory treatment. 
 
• Carefully study the possibility of introducing a health voucher scheme, in which 
poor citizens would directly control the health subsidies given to them (instead of 
the current scheme where the subsidies were given to health providers). This is 
done to minimize possible leakage of the subsidy to higher income patients and to 
promote accountability and improved service quality. Voucher holders could 
choose any health providers they feel would provide the best services available to 
them (both public and private providers would be allowed to treat voucher 
holders), so there would be competition between providers to attract the most 
voucher holders to their facilities and this could only be accomplished if their 
services are improved and more accountable. Of course, leakage could also occur 
in a voucher scheme if the poor voucher holders are able to sell their vouchers to 
those who have higher income, so steps should be taken to minimize this 
possibility (such as recording the names of voucher holders and assigning them a 
unique identification number). 
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Appendix 1: Revenues and Expenditures of JPKM Scheme in Purbalingga District: 
Fiscal Year 2002-2003 (in Indonesian Rupiah) 
Revenue   
Local Government Subsidies for:   
Gakin  996,902,016  
Non-Gakin  271,080,000  
Total Local Government Subsidies  1,267,982,016 
Central Government Subsidy (PKPS BBM)  291,417,984 
Premiums Collected from non-Gakin Members  645,420,000 
FY 2001/2002 Surplus 9,715,952 
Interest Income 44,715,978 
   
Total Revenue  2,259,251,930 
   
Expenditures  
Capitation Payment to RSUD  1,033,206,000 
Capitation Payment to Puskesmas Outpatients  731,040,000 
Capitation Payment to Puskesmas In-patients  73,104,000 
Incentives for kaders, program coordinators, etc.  102,697,600 
Bapel Salaries and Admin Expenses  317,026,121 
   
   
Total Expenditures   2,257,073,721 
   
Surplus (Revenue-Expenditures)   2,178,209 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of JPKM Funds' Benefit Distribution in Purbalingga District: 
Fiscal Year 2002-2003 (in Indonesian Rupiah) 
Total funds available     2,259,251,930 
    
Funds allocated to Gakin members  
Local government subsidies       996,902,016 
Central government subsidies       291,417,984 
Total funds allocated to Gakin members     1,288,320,000 
Percentage of funds allocated to Gakin  57.02%
    
    
Funds allocated to non-Gakin members  
Local government subsidies       271,080,000 
Premiums paid by non-Gakin members       645,420,000 
Other sources of funds (interest, etc.)         54,431,930 
Total revenue funds to non-Gakin members        970,931,930 
Percentage of funds allocated to Non-Gakin  42.98%
    
    
Allocation of funds at puskesmas  
JPKM funds allocated to puskesmas        804,144,000 
Average monthly allocations to puskesmas  67,012,000 
Average number of puskesmas visitors/month 30,614 
Average number of Gakin puskesmas visitors/month 6,404 
Average number of non-Gakin puskesmas visitors/month 24,210 
Average funds allocated to Gakin patients/month  14,017,928 
Percentage of puskesmas funds allocated to Gakin patients  20.92%
Average funds allocated to non-Gakin patients/month  52,994,072 
Percentage of puskesmas funds allocated to Non-Gakin patients  79.08%
    
    
Allocation of funds at RSUD  
JPKM funds allocated to RSUD     1,033,206,000 
Average monthly allocations to RSUD   86,100,500 
Average number of RSUD visitors/month 97 
Average number of Gakin RSUD visitors/month 12 
Average number of non-Gakin RSUD visitors/month 85 
Average funds allocated to Gakin patients/month  10,651,608 
Percentage of RSUD funds allocated to Gakin patients  12.37%
Average funds allocated to non-Gakin patients/month  75,448,892 
Percentage of RSUD funds allocated to Non-Gakin patients  87.63%
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Appendix 3: Revenues and Expenditures of the JPK-Gakin in East Sumba District: 
Fiscal Year 2003-2004 (in Indonesian Rupiah) 
Fiscal Year 2003 Revenue  
    
Central government subsidies  
Basic health care delivery 2,163,000,000  
Referral to hospital 450,000,000  
Medicine distribution 27,470,000  
Other expenditures 25,000,000  
Total central government subsidies 2,665,470,000  
    
Local government subsidies  
Purchase of medicine 1,500,000,000  
Premium payment for Gakin 392,000,000  
Total local government subsidies 1,892,000,000  
    
Total revenue for Fiscal Year 2003 4,557,470,000 
    
Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue (until August 2004)  
    
Central government subsidies  
Basic health care delivery 1,071,583,000  
Referral to hospital 688,777,000  
Total central government subsidies 1,760,360,000  
    
Local government subsidies  
Medicine purchase and premium 2,000,000,000  
Other subsidies 81,520,000  
Total local government subsidies 2,081,520,000  
    
Total revenue for Fiscal Year 2004    3,841,880,000 
(until August 2004)  
Interest income (until June 2004) 60,143,049 
    
Total combined revenue Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004   8,459,493,049 
    
Expenditures (Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004)   
    
Outpatient treatment at puskesmas 1,548,888,000  
In-patient treatment at puskesmas 114,112,500  
In-patient treatment at hospitals 1,634,327,560  
Bapel management fee (5%) 218,668,000  
Medicine purchase 1,778,017,430  
Medicine distribution 4,120,500  
Claim validation and verification 81,520,000  
Other expenditures 25,000,000  
    
Total Expenditures  5,404,653,990 
    
Surplus (Revenue-Expenditure)  3,054,839,059 
 
